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Modernizing and Transforming Criminal Justice
in England and Wales: 1997–2015 From New Labour
to the Coalition Government
Significant changes have occurred in criminal and social
justice, penal policy, and probation since the 1980s in
England and Wales. It is of particular national and inter-
national interest to reflect on the era of New Labour (1997–
2010), followed by the Coalition Government (2010–2015).
New Labour advanced the process of modernizing public
services, and the Coalition Government initiated a ‘‘reha-
bilitation revolution’’ driven forward by a competition
strategy that created a mixed economy of offender services.
This process culminated in the privatization of probation in
October 2014 through the establishment of twenty-one
Community Rehabilitation Companies. This article con-
centrates on systematically plotting major changes that
have occurred during the previous eighteen years, and
touches upon questions of justice and the political wisdom
of some of these decisions.
I. New Labour and the Modernization of Public Services,
1997–2001
New Labour’s manifesto before the general election of May
1997, after eighteen years of conservative administrations
(1979–1997)—New Labour because Britain deserves better—
explained modernization as a new bond of trust between
the political establishment and the British people, which
was exemplified in ten specific commitments. These were
education, tax, the economy, getting the unemployed into
work, rebuilding the National Health Service, families and
communities in a modernized welfare state, the environ-
ment, the imperative to clean up politics, and leadership in
the modern world. At number six was a reference to being
tough on crime and its causes by halving the time it takes
persistent juvenile offenders to come to court.
New Labour set the country on a different course, in
a spirit of rebuilding and renewing, on the foundation of
progress and justice, value of equal worth, with no one cast
aside in what would be a fairer and safer society. A narrative
of personal responsibility, which legitimated a more puni-
tive response, constructed the politics of crime. This
approach set New Labour apart from previous Labour
administrations.1 New Labour had transformed its criminal
justice philosophy since the early 1990s, so the claim could
be made in 1997 that it had become the natural party of law
and order. This was a critical selling point to secure
electoral legitimacy. Modernization would fast-track the
punishment of recalcitrant young people, reform the
Crown Prosecution Service to convict more criminals, put
more police in uniform, and crack down on petty crimes
and the malaise of disorder.
Although there is no overt reference to probation in
Campbell’s book of the Blair era,2 it is likely that probation
was mentioned prior to 1997 within political debates on
modernization. We step from speculation onto solid
ground by 1998 with the proposal for a modernized pro-
bation service in the consultative document, Prisons-
Probation: Joining Forces to Protect the Public.3 After decades
of ideological, philosophical, and self-evident organiza-
tional distinctions between prisons and probation, a period
of consultation was established to explore closer integration
and thereby improve efficiency and enhance performance.
Was it possible for these two organizations, which had for
decades pursued their own distinctive penal-welfare
trajectories, to work more closely together to reduce
re-offending; better prepare prisoners for release; share
resources, information, knowledge, and skills; and recon-
figure organizational structures to provide value for money
on the platform of new public management?
In the second chapter of Prisons-Probation is a reference
to modernizing the organizational framework of probation.
Significantly, it boldly claims that legislation that continues
to direct employees to advise, assist, and befriend—language
originally in the Probation of Offenders Act 1907—is out of
touch with the expectations of the courts.4 The service had
become more orientated toward public protection, and
a modernized service must confront, challenge, and change
offenders, rather than advise, assist, and befriend them.
The document states there is a lack of probation account-
ability to central government due to fragmented governance
arrangements, a claim the chief probation officers in the
fifty-six local area services would have disputed. Conse-
quently, the service needs to be better organized and forge
closer links with central government, the prison system,
police, mental health services, local authorities, and the
Crown Prosecution Service. Interestingly, the theme of
modernization and cultural transformation involves, it is
argued, much clearer national direction and stronger
national leadership, and the Home Secretary must be able
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to have political responsibility—centrally imposed com-
mand, power, and control—over local area probation ser-
vices. Windlesham concurs when stating that in the area of
criminal policy, as in other areas of public administration,
‘‘the demands of modernisation called for models of central
control, rather than delegated authority and local account-
ability.’’5 From 1997 to 1998, New Labour modernizers
dragged probation into the politics of modernization. This
was confirmed in 1999 when it was asserted that govern-
ment has a mission to modernize, renewing the country for
the new millennium: this would involvew modernising the
education system, the national health service, the economy,
and the criminal justice system. Even though the Prisons-
Probation review gave due consideration to the merging of
two organizations into a single service, to reduce the cultural
divide, at this juncture it was a step too far—but not for long.
II. A New Urgency for Reform, 2001–2005
By 2001, after a four-year term in office, New Labour’s
manifesto—Ambitions for Britain—included pledges for the
next five years on economics, schools, and health. There
was also a pledge for 6,000 extra police recruits to tackle
drugs and crime and to build upon the claim that crime is
down by 10 percent compared to 1997; in fact conventional
crime had been falling overall since the mid-1990s.6 The
manifesto repeated the language of tough-on-crime and the
related themes of punishment and individual responsibility
for one’s actions, regardless of different social circum-
stances. Outbursts of criminality are constructed as a battle
that government has to fight and win on behalf of the
people. In fact, the war on crime, the war on terror, and the
war on poverty became cogent political motifs in the United
Kingdom and the United States.
Reforming and modernizing impulses toward criminal
justice were the subject of a white paper urging the quicker
prosecution of offenders, taking victims much more seri-
ously, continuing the fight against crime, and developing
Crime Reduction Partnerships. Accordingly, Criminal Jus-
tice: The Way Ahead7 acknowledged that the increase in
crime over the previous twenty-five years was partly a result
of unemployment and lack of opportunities for the
unskilled, the blight of drugs, and the availability of con-
sumer goods. Even though themechanisms for the creation
of a responsible and law-abiding society do not inhere solely
within criminal justice systems—socioeconomic forces and
wider structural factors must be factored into an analysis of
human behavior—nevertheless a modernized criminal
justice system must function instrumentally to prevent
crime and reduce reoffending, deal efficiently with cases,
respond appropriately to victims, and be more accountable
for its decisions. Fundamentally, what is desirable is
a criminal justice system that delivers justice for all.8
Parts 1 and 2 of The Way Ahead summarize the reforms
that had been introduced since 1997, and continue the
theme of modernization: More persistent offenders will be
apprehended and convicted, as 100,000 hard-core offen-
ders could be responsible for half of all crime, and tough
and effective punishments will become more intense for
them. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 exemplifies ‘‘the more
you offend, the tougher it will be’’ penal philosophy. Mod-
ernization is also associated with giving the police, Crown
Prosecution Service, courts, and other agencies what they
require to do the job defined by central government, and to
build public confidence. Moreover, modernization encap-
sulates the Auld review of, and reforms to, the criminal law
(begun in 1999)9 and the Halliday review of sentencing
practices (begun in 2000)10 by reducing delays in the sys-
tem, bringing more people to justice, providing a better deal
for witnesses and victims, and facilitating more effective
partnerships to enhance delivery of services. It also involved
the creation of the National Probation Service in 2001.11 If
these changes were not challenging enough for the crimi-
nal justice system to absorb, along came another set of
reforms that established the National Offender Manage-
ment Service (NOMS).
In 2002, Patrick Carter was asked to undertake a review
of correctional services. His report, Managing Offenders,
Reducing Crime: A New Approach was published in 2003,12
the same year the new Criminal Justice Act went into effect.
This report analyzed the state of the prisons, overcrowding,
and the lack of help available for short-term prisoners fol-
lowing release. Carter proposed the linear concept of end-
to-end management of offender services and the creation of
a single agency, NOMS, to deliver it.13 NOMS would consist
of a Chief Executive and National Offender Manager, and
ten Regional Offender Managers responsible for commis-
sioning services, both custodial provision and in the com-
munity, for the management of offenders in that region.
Contestability, meaning competition, in a marketized
mixed economy of provision would sharpen effectiveness
and performance, and target achievement. In other words,
it is possible that the work being undertaken by probation
could be awarded to other organizations within the public,
private, and voluntary sectors. This was not a novel policy
because during the early 1990s, a decade before NOMS, the
rise of a pluralism of offender service providers had chal-
lenged the monopoly position of probation.
It should be confirmed that help and support for offen-
ders remained part of the NOMS structure, as services exist
to respond to problems related to accommodation, educa-
tion, training and employment, finances, and addictions.
Nevertheless, the new organization was criticized for sus-
taining punitive controlism, depersonalization, and depro-
fessionalization. On the theme of punitive controlism, it was
explained that the retributive penal agenda, fuelled by puni-
tive populism, radically threatened to shift the purpose of
probation ‘‘from one of caring control to one of punitive
control.’’14 Furthermore, the National Association of Proba-
tion Officers and the Probation Boards Association raised
a number of concerns in response to developments associ-
ated with privatization and punishment.15 These issues
became acute between 2010 and 2015.16
By 2004, the strategic aim of Confident Communities17
was articulated as social change to achieve enhanced
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security. Also, the objectives of the Home Office for a safe,
just, tolerant society included helping people to feel more
secure in their homes and communities. The interests of
the law-abiding citizen must come first, and they will be
protected from the threat of terrorism, illegal immigration,
and criminal disorder on the streets. The theme of mod-
ernization reverberated throughout Confident Communities
when addressing ongoing reforms within the criminal
justice system, the programme of structural and organiza-
tional changes that commenced in 1997, and elevating the
status of victims. There are supporting references to the
Halliday review and the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the
delivery of effective punishments, the creation of NOMS,
enforcement, and crime prevention. It is important to
acknowledge that offenders will be supported to achieve the
goal of behavioral change. However, if they do not respond
positively to the offer of support, negative consequences
will follow in the form of tougher enforcement practices.
Next, according to Cutting Crime, Delivering Justice,18
published concurrently with Confident Communities, the
vision for the criminal justice system for the next five years
(2004–2009) is: increased public confidence in the system;
a high standard of service for victims and witnesses;
bringing more offenders to justice; rigorous enforcement
(mentioned again); coordinated services and reduced
delays—all of which constitute the normative elements of
modernization. Again, modernizing reforms that have
occurred since 1997 are reprised, with specific reference to
probation within the context of more resources being allo-
cated to the police, Crown Prosecution Service, and prisons.
In fact, when turning to probation, it is lamented that the
training of new probation officers ceased under conserva-
tive governments between 1995 and 1998. No newly qual-
ified staff entered the profession for several years in the
fifty-six local area services.19 The documents published
during 2004 signalled an end to the 1960s liberal consen-
sus on law and order. Creating safer communities are to be
pursued through a punitive war on crime, rather than
ameliorative social policies to reduce inequality.20
III. Beyond 2005: Drifting Toward the End of New Labour
New Labour’s 2005 manifesto, Britain forward, not back,
repeated the refrain of tough on crime and its causes and
proudly asserted that sentencing had become tougher,
illustrated by 16,000more prison places compared to 1997.
It also confirmed that NOMS, established in 2003–2004,
ensured that every offender will be case-managed from the
beginning to the end of their sentence. The manifesto
referred to Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), which
resulted in the criminalization of low-level disorderliness,
a proper focus on victims and the law-abiding majority, and
the commitment to cut crime and send dangerous offen-
ders to prison. There was also a reference to making com-
munity sentences more effective, a persistent theme over
the last two decades in England and Wales.
On 19 September 2005, Charles Clarke, Home Secre-
tary, made a speech to the Prison Reform Trust,Where Next
for Penal Policy.21 Although sentencing within the reformed
criminal justice system is conducted according to various
sentencing philosophies, Clarke affirmed that government
will be tough on crime and criminals, particularly danger-
ous and persistent offenders. The Home Secretary’s speech
addressed NOMS within the context of organizational
change and the modernization agenda by bringing prisons
and probation closer together. The central priority is to
reduce reoffending by 5 percent by 2008, and then 10
percent by 2010. The role of the new offender manager is
considered—note the change of job designation from
‘‘probation officer’’ to ‘‘offender manager’’—as is the plan
to develop a mixed economy of provision, thus breaking up
the monopoly position of the National Probation Service in
the delivery of offender services. He asserted that NOMS is
committed to rehabilitation, but although a number of
prison and probation areas have responded positively to the
prevailing challenges and improved, other areas have not
achieved as much as government considered necessary.
This is why Charles Clarke was personally committed to the
creation of a vibrant mixed economy within NOMS. The
policy emphasized that encouraging contestability among
the public, private, and voluntary sectors will enhance and
improve the delivery of offender services. Consequently,
the vision for the future consisted of purchasing services
from different providers—this may no longer be a proba-
tion organization—who will be expected to achieve targets
and provide value for money, and to drive up standards of
performance within a market-driven criminal justice
system.
During 2005, and updated in 2006, the Home Office
was involved in producing the NOMS Offender Management
Model.22 Included within this document was guidance to
probation areas on the tiering (stacking) of cases, to relate
resources to the assessed category of risk—low, medium,
high, and very high. All four substantive tiers will deliver
some form of punishment to offenders, even though the
document articulates the importance of social work rela-
tionships as well: Tier 1, punish; Tier 2, punish and help;
Tier 3, punish and help and change; Tier 4, punish and help
and change and control. Tier 1 cases comprise low to
medium risk categories; by contrast, Tier 4 contains high to
very high risk categories, including public protection cases.
Tiers 3 and 4 will attract most of the resources and be the
preserve of trained and professionally qualified staff. The
reconfiguration of resources and services by the risk status
of offenders anticipated the Rehabilitation Revolution of
2010–2015.
A spate of documents appeared during 2006. Notwith-
standing the complexities involved in obtaining an accurate
picture of crime statistics, the Five Year Strategy for Pro-
tecting the Public and Reducing Re-offending23 restated the
claim that whilst crime is decreasing, the strategic aim
remains to cut reoffending, protect the public, keep the
right people in prison, and manage the risks posed by
offenders. The offender manager is responsible for the
punishment and rehabilitation of offenders, including the
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promotion of closer links with the prison system via the
newly emerging NOMS structure. The Five Year Strategy
underlines the political message that even though the lan-
guage of punishment, reparation, and rehabilitation over-
lap, punishment is a legitimate activity in prison and in the
community, and that both probation and prison should
prevent re-offending. The context remains one of being
tough on crime, illustrated by the assertion that we are
‘‘catching and convicting more criminals.’’24 It is impera-
tive that the public is kept safe from serious, violent, dan-
gerous, and persistent offenders. Risks must be identified
and managed via the Offender Assessment System
(OASys),25 which is considered one of the most advanced
systems of its kind in the world.26 Once again key political
messages are delivered on enforcement,27 specifying that
when offenders breach their community orders, over 90
percent are enforced within ten working days, that is, they
are returned to the sentencing court normally after two
failed appointments. Nevertheless, confronting and resolv-
ing factors related to obtaining work, housing, and drugs
can enhance managing offenders to prevent reoffending
and improving compliance.28
Much had been achieved since 1997, when the moder-
nizers came to office. Nevertheless, the modernization of
the criminal justice system was not completed, as was the
message of Rebalancing the Criminal Justice System.29 The
report claimed crime had fallen by 35 percent since 1997,
and that the risk of becoming a victim of crime was the
lowest since the British Crime Survey began in 1981; that
public confidence in the criminal justice system was on the
rise, and worry about antisocial behavior had fallen. Mod-
ernization, which assumed the quality of a permanent
revolution, is constructed positively by recourse to the
provision of more resources for criminal justice agencies,
investment, improved performance, partnerships, NOMS,
stricter enforcement, new laws, ASBOs, and bringing more
people to justice. Whilst much had been achieved, the sys-
tem must be rebalanced in favor of victims rather than
offenders. Paragraph 3.29 of the Rebalancing document
addressed probation specifically by stating that resources
should target serious, not minor, offenders, underpinned
by the new tiering system. Also, the intention remained to
break up probation’s monopoly by creating a mixed econ-
omy of provision through the NOMS structure, which
required new legislation to enable other potential providers
to get involved. Finally, the document turned to the aspi-
ration of Delivering Simple, Speedy, Summary Justice,30 the
‘‘Triple S’’ agenda.
This Delivering document, another integral component
of the modernizing agenda, attempted to push ahead with
a more effective and efficient criminal justice system, par-
ticularly within the magistrates’ courts, which deal with
95 percent of criminal cases. This had profound implica-
tions for the work of probation, primarily because the
pressure to deal with more and more cases expeditiously
touches the organization where reports (written sentencing
documents) are being prepared for the courts, particularly
magistrates’ courts. In other words, if one of the aims of the
‘‘Triple S’’ agenda is to reduce the average number of
hearings before a case is finally sentenced from five or six to
one for guilty pleas, thereby eradicating costly adjourn-
ments, and if the court requires more information on the
offender, then this will be in the form of a Fast Delivery
Report rather than a full and detailed Pre-Sentence
Report.31
By 2006, it had been more than two years since the
Carter report32 resulted in the emergence of NOMS and
proposals to utilize the diverse talents of public, private, and
voluntary agencies. As John Reid stated in Public Value
Partnerships, the public sector is valued and will have
a continuing role to play, ‘‘[h]owever, all current providers
should be open to challenge and able to demonstrate that
the services they offer are the best available.’’33 If the Pro-
bation Service is seen to be failing under the reconstituted
arrangements, another organization could take it over to
deliver effective and efficient services. Government plans
for extending contestability are not to cut costs or even to
have competition for its own sake, but rather to improve
standards of service by encouraging innovative practices
that will result in less crime and getting the best mix of
services and service providers.
The Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit published an inter-
esting document, initially confirming that there has been
a tougher sentencing regime since 1997.34 The average
length of custodial sentences at the Crown Court increased
from twenty to thirty months between 1994 and 2004.
Moreover, there was an increase in more demanding
community services that had displaced fines rather than
alternatives to custodial sentences. As reported in The
Telegraph, a leaked Home Office letter, ‘‘Responding to
Economic Challenges,’’ warned that the global economic
downturn is expected to result in more crime, fewer police,
and more illegal immigration, coupled with far right
extremism. After studying previous recessions and effects
on crime and policing, Home Office computer modelling
indicated that an economic downturn ‘‘would place signif-
icant upward pressure on acquisitive crime and therefore
overall crime figures.’’35
Ten Years of Criminal Justice under Labour36 is significant
because it constitutes an independent audit of events since
1997. From the beginning the intentions of New Labour
were clear: tough on crime and its causes, and introducing
modernizing reforms across the whole public sector,
including the criminal justice system, manifested by more
investment and harsher punishments. The priorities of
New Labour were to narrow the justice gap (bringing more
offenders to justice), to reduce reoffending, and to respond
to antisocial behavior. Central concerns were policing,
youth justice, and drugs. Indubitably, more resources were
allocated to the criminal justice system, but the critical
question remained: Has it all worked? The audit results are
mixed, notwithstanding the reforms that were pushed
through at a relentless pace. Significantly, this echoes the
aforementioned Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit
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document,37 and questions remained about the efficacy of
the criminal justice system to achieve its objectives. In other
words, is it the right or most effective instrument to
respond to illegal forms of behavior, particularly when
some of these are associated with socioeconomic structural
factors?
Next, the importance of Lord Carter’s Review of Prisons,
published in December 2007,38 was in the analysis of those
drivers behind the 60 percent—more than 30,000—rise in
the prison population in England and Wales between June
1995 and November 2007, by which time it stood at 81,547.
First, Carter addressed changes in public attitudes and the
political climate, including the law-and-order themes of the
1980s; the break-up of consensus, economic decline, rising
crime, and retreat from rehabilitation; the Jamie Bulger and
Stephen Lawrence murders in 1993, and accompanying
media responses; and developments within community
punishment and the Prison Works debate in the 1990s.
Consequently, there is a greater public preoccupation with
crime, fuelled by media reporting, and accompanied by
a heightened emotional tone in the way crime issues are
presented.
Second, legislation and the sentencing framework,
including the drift toward more punitive sentencing, are
alluded to, particularly the sixty-six pieces of legislation
since 1995. It is of interest to refer to the comments of Lord
Justice Auld, who said that the public’s confidence in the
criminal justice system is damaged if, as happened all too
often, legislative reforms are insufficiently considered and
‘‘hurried through in seeming response to political pres-
sures or for quick political advantage.’’39
Third, Carter noted custody rates and sentence lengths
with greater sentencer demand for probation and prison.
The number of community penalties at all courts increased
from 129,922 in 1995 to 190,837 in 2006. Fourth, alluded
to earlier, there had been a much greater focus on harsher
enforcement practices and more emphasis on risk, harm,
and public protection. When turning to the newly created
Suspended Sentence Order, introduced by the Criminal
Justice Act 2003, Carter recounted that a significant num-
ber of suspended prison sentences were being given for
summary offences, and that ‘‘a significant number of these
would previously have received non-custodial sentences.’’40
Patrick Carter published his review on prisons by the
end of 2007. In May 2007, the Ministry of Justice had been
created, which assumed responsibility for probation and
prisons following restructuring within the Home Office,
with the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office being
separate departments. One of Carter’s proposals was to
reappraise the headquarters function of NOMS, which
would have implications for both prisons and probation.
This was initiated during January 2008 to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of managing offenders and the
refocusing of resources to enhance front-line delivery. By
March 2008, this resulted in bringing probation and pris-
ons even closer together within a streamlined headquarters
function, and the rationalization of regional structures.
With this latest bout of restructuring, Phil Wheatley,
Director General of Her Majesty’s Prison Service, became
Director General of NOMS, with material changes to the
upper managerial and strategic reaches of the organization
ensuing.
Changes at the national level were established on April
1, 2008, and further changes to regional structures were
introduced by April 2009. As a result, each of the ten
regions in England and Wales appointed a Director of
Offender Management to coordinate and commission all
probation and prison services from the public, private, and
third/voluntary sectors, consistent with the legislative pro-
visions contained in the Offender Management Act 2007.
These arrangements were put in place in London and
Wales during 2008, and the Prison Service London Area
Office and the office of the Regional Offender Manager
were formally merged into the office of Director of
Offender Management. It may be suggested that these
changes were largely cosmetic, primarily concerned with
reducing costs, and would hardly be noticed lower down the
organizational structure by prison officers and probation
offender managers. But instead, senior managerial and
organizational reconfigurations within NOMS culminated
in the declining influence of the probation ethos through-
out the whole of the criminal justice system.41
IV. On the Cusp of the Transition from New Labour to
Coalition Government
In 2008, two years before the general election, the conser-
vative party published Prisons with a Purpose.42 This docu-
ment refers to energy supplies, pollution, economic
stability, national security, immigration, transport, and
development, before turning to crime and prisons. Stu-
dents of criminal justice are inured to consulting the crisis
literature on crime, prison overcrowding and longer prison
sentences since 1993, reoffending rates, community sen-
tences that lack credibility, and the volume of crime com-
mitted by offenders with previous convictions. Accordingly,
the ‘‘right way to reduce the prison population is to break
the cycle of re-offending and reduce crime.’’43 It is imper-
ative to restore confidence in the criminal justice system,
which will be achieved by launching a ‘‘rehabilitative revo-
lution’’ in which community and prison sentences reflect
four basic principles: punishment, rehabilitation, employ-
ment, and reparation for victims. Community sentences
must be tough and demanding to enhance their credibility
and to improve compliance, which repeats familiar themes.
Furthermore, the ongoing crisis in criminal justice is
explained by insufficient prison capacity and the imposition
of centrally imposed targets that paralyzed prison governors
and probation officers. In fact, the ‘‘Probation Service in
particular has been burdened with too many targets.’’44
This analysis admits to organizational weaknesses but also
proffers liberating possibilities after the stultifying, target-
driven, and bureaucratically obsessed governmental
regimes since 1997. However, it intriguingly reinforces that
‘‘[w]e want to see new providers brought in to aid the
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probation service . . . ,’’45 a statement that continues the
theme of criminal justice privatization.
There is a vestige of hope for probation services after
nationalization in 2001, with the establishment of the
National Probation Service, then after 2003 with NOMS,
because of the tantalizing prospect of these changes ener-
gizing professional autonomy and discretion. Nevertheless,
a closer reading of the text precipitates a number of nig-
gling concerns as it outlines subjecting prison regimes to
Payment by Results (PbR),46 expanding the role of the
voluntary and private sectors, and incentivizing perfor-
mance. Some features are innovative in tone, for example,
Payment by Results; others continue previous develop-
ments such as value for money and the deeper penetration
of privatization and market expansion. However, two sig-
nificant omissions should be considered.
First, analysis and response are not intellectually
embedded within an explanatory historical, political-
economic, and ethical-cultural context. The document fails
to consider political decisions affecting criminal justice
during the previous thirty years, the impact of govern-
mental policies, material conditions leading to the eco-
nomic crisis in 2007–2008, neoliberal ideology, and the
moral implications of prioritizing fiscal efficiencies over
offender services. This lacuna distorts the analysis com-
pared, for example, to a much earlier Home Office
Review.47 Second, there is an air of silence on the content of,
and arguments for, the moral coordinates of criminal jus-
tice and penal policy. Canton argues that work with offen-
ders is amorally significant activity that cannot be reduced to
technical gimmicks for achieving efficiency and effective-
ness.48 Criminal justice must combine fiscal considera-
tions and ethical demands, but Prisons with a Purpose
remains silent on the latter. In 2008, the battle lines are
sketched to differentiate New Labour from conservative
criminal justice policies during the period leading toward
the general election in May 2010.
V. Coalition Government and Criminal Justice,
2010–2015
In December 2010, the new Coalition Government of lib-
eral and conservative interests published a Green Paper,
Breaking the Cycle,49 which is significant, because it pro-
posed fundamental changes to the criminal justice system
to ensure ‘‘improved public safety through more effective
punishments that reduce the prospect of criminals reof-
fending time and time again.’’50 Breaking the Cycle con-
firmed that the prison population had doubled since 1993,
but fails to acknowledge this was because of decisions of
a previous Conservative administration. Moreover, recon-
viction rates are too high and costly at £7–10 billion annu-
ally, and there are 16,000 active offenders at any one time,
each with 75 previous convictions. There is also the
admission that the weight of criminal legislation since 1997
has been excessive. The principles of reform underpinning
the proposed rehabilitation revolution are public protection,
punishment and rehabilitation, transparency and
accountability, and the decentralization of services.
Payment by Results51 is foregrounded as a radical reform
that signals the transference of financial risk from taxpayers
to the new providers. Consequently, there will be a compe-
tition strategy to determine the provision of services
according to commercial and market principles. In other
words, the Ministry of Justice will no longer pay for good
intentions.
Modernising Commissioning52 comments on the rehabil-
itation revolution and associated plans for commissioning
services through the expansion of mutuals, cooperatives,
charities, and social enterprises in operating public ser-
vices. At this early stage the Coalition Government is
actively turning toward profit-making businesses with
commercial objectives to assume an enhanced role in
public service reform. The accumulating documentary evi-
dence provides a strong suggestion for how public services
should be delivered in future, the relentless demand to
improve efficiency and effectiveness, investment opportu-
nities, the superiority of private over public provision, the
expansion of markets, and reducing risks to tax-payers
through Payment by Results. Accordingly, ‘‘As announced
in the Spending Review, the Government intends to iden-
tify particular opportunities to expand the use of payment
by results across particular service areas.’’53 I have argued
more fully elsewhere54 that the privatization, marketization,
and diversification of services, all of which have occurred
without rigorous intellectual debate, damaged the moral
fabric of criminal justice.
The following year,Open Public Services asserted that the
reform of public services is a ‘‘key progressive cause.’’55 It
conflates reform with the task of civilizing society, but
omits the problem of reconciling the future commercial
platform with the ethical provision of services. This docu-
ment continues the thematic trend of reform through the
fiscal mechanism of PbR, which is being applied to
numerous organizational spheres, including the Work
Programme, public health, drug and alcohol recovery ser-
vices, children’s centers, vulnerable people, as well as the
Rehabilitation Revolution in prisons and probation.56 Five
additional principles of reform are cited: increased choice,
decentralization, diversity of providers, fair access to ser-
vices, and accountability to taxpayers. With no supporting
evidence, it is asserted, ‘‘Our reforms are the best way to
deliver better services; indeed, they are the only way we can
deliver improved, modern public services in a time of fiscal
consolidation and growing demand.’’57
Next, the Competition Strategy58 reinforced the afore-
mentioned documentary themes, confirming that compe-
tition in offender services can be traced to 1992 with the
first private prison at HMP Wolds.59 However, the market
in noncustodial sentences is much less developed. There-
fore, the Ministry of Justice aspires to build on the platform
of competition, inchoate privatization, the private finance
initiative (PFI) prison building programme, better value for
money (VfM) in the delivery of prison escort and custody
services, bail accommodation, and the expansion of
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electronic monitoring. A competition strategy is required to
identify the most suitable providers to deliver offender
services, which include custodial provision, community
services, health, substance misuse, and learning skills.
When shifting the focus from custody to the community,
‘‘The starting point here is different, as the use of compe-
tition in delivering core probation services is less devel-
oped, as is the market for providing these services.’’60 The
drivers of public service and criminal justice reform are
specified as financial rationalization, value for money
(VfM), outcomes, target achievement, risk and reward,
business models and commercial practices, the diversity of
providers, privatization, markets, and competition between
the sectors. Again, for comparative purposes, this operating
framework is incompatible with the aforementioned
Review.61 It is also discernibly different from the 1980s and
1990s, primarily because the nature and scale of reform are
more extensive. The past was a different place, intellectually
and morally, compared to the period under consideration
here.
Two significant documents were published in March
2012: Punishment and Reform: Effective Community Sen-
tences62 and Punishment and Reform: Effective Probation
Services.63 Previously, Prisons with a Purpose stated that
reconviction rates were too high, indicative of a lamentable
failure. Now, four years later, allowing probation to retain
responsibility for approximately 40,000 high-risk offen-
ders and the production of court reports for magistrates and
judges will remedy the problem. The remaining low- to
medium-risk offenders, approximately 220,000, will be the
subject of market competition among the public, private,
and voluntary sectors. ‘‘The aim of all this is to free up
a traditional, old-fashioned system and introduce new ways
of operating and delivering that will help drive a reduction
in reoffending.’’64 Effective probation services extends the
principle of competition outlined in the Offender Man-
agement Act 2007.
On reflection, it would have been beneficial to consider
with greater intellectual perspicacity on why the ‘‘modern’’
is presumed to be superior to established historical tradi-
tions; new superior to old; competition better than coop-
eration; private enterprise superior and more efficient than
public duty and service. Additionally, efficiency targets
swamp moral questions appertaining to justice, and
restructuring and rebalancing unbalances the criminal
justice system by eroding former historical, cultural, and
ethico-cultural conventions.65 Finally, also during 2012, the
White Paper Swift and Sure Justice66 further supported the
intellectual justification for reforming the criminal justice
system in England and Wales, by repeating the arguments
for modernizing an outdated infrastructure that delivers
justice too slowly and costly.
Transforming Rehabilitationmade a great impact in 2013,
beginning in January with a period of consultation until
February 22.67 This second part of this New Year docu-
ment, A Revolution in the Way We Manage Offenders, pro-
vided further detail on the structural mechanisms required
to deliver reform, and posed nineteen questions for con-
sultation.68 These questions refer to PbR, the pricing
structure and incentives for providers, bureaucracy, incen-
tivizing performance, managing poor performance, the
supply chain of offender services, integrating the public,
private, and voluntary sectors, relevant legislation, non-
compliance with the orders of the courts, probation and
other delivery systems, maximizing local expertise, main-
taining professional standards, and the role of the Inspec-
torate. Subsequently, the Ministry of Justice published its
response to the consultation in Transforming Rehabilitation:
A Strategy for Reform.69 First, under the rubric of Reducing
Reoffending, rehabilitation and mentoring services will be
statutorily provided to all offenders including those sen-
tenced to less than twelve months. Consequently ‘‘Com-
peting services will allow us to use innovative payment
mechanisms which drive a focus on reducing reoffending.
Providers’ level of payment will therefore be dependent on
the reductions in reoffending they achieve.’’70 PbR is elu-
cidated as a mechanism to facilitate fiscal incentives; pro-
viders must assist all offenders, not just those who will
‘‘succeed,’’ which would rig payment in favor of investors’
vested interests; providers will be financially rewarded for
success when offenders and former prisoners achieve
complete desistance for twelve months; payment mechan-
isms will take account of the total number of offences
committed by offenders. Therefore, ‘‘The combined pay-
ment mechanism, including ‘fee for service’ and ‘payment
by results’ elements will mean that providers need to work
successfully with all offenders, in order to get paid in full.’’71
Next, the section on Protecting the Public proposes a new
public sector probation service after 60 to 70 percent of its
work has been opened up to competition.72 Then, Making
the System Work indicates that some probation staff will
transfer into the private and voluntary sectors.73 This sig-
nals the end of probation trusts through the creation of
a new National Probation Service managed by the Ministry
of Justice and NOMS. It was envisaged that by autumn
2014 there would be twenty-one Contract Package Areas of
diverse providers called Community Rehabilitation Com-
panies to deliver criminal justice services alongside
a truncated probation system. Between May 2013 and
autumn 2014, potential providers, including large private
companies—Interserve, G4S, and Sodexo Justice Services
among them—were encouraged to bid for Ministry of
Justice contracts.
In September 2013, the Ministry of Justice issued the
Target Operating Manual,74 which consolidated the struc-
ture to deliver more effective rehabilitative outcomes. It
includes through-the-gate services for offenders sentenced
to less than twelve months imprisonment that necessitate
new licence arrangements. Furthermore, the reformed
structure endorses marketized competition among the
sectors, the flexibility to innovate, a new National Probation
Service, and twenty-one Community Rehabilitation Com-
panies. It specifies that payment to the Rehabilitation
Companies ‘‘will be based on a weighted annual volume of
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offender starts, with a proportion of the payment at risk,
dependent on their performance in reducing reoffend-
ing.’’75 As discussed in Chapter 3 of the Target Operating
Manual, the National Probation Service will be responsible
for writing court reports on offenders and providing sen-
tencing advice to the courts, risk assessment, allocating
cases, the management of high-risk cases, enforcement of
community orders and licences, Parole Board duties, and
Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA).
Accordingly, existing Probation Trusts will be dissolved on
March 31, 2014, and staff allocated to either the National
Probation Service (NPS) or a Community Rehabilitation
Company (CRC).76 Nevertheless, a number of concerns
were articulated during the transitional phase before the
new arrangements were finally determined: the necessity
for and pace of reforms and their rationale, making the
transitional arrangements work, tender processes, how the
market will work and the relationship between NPS and
CRC if there is a change in the risk status of offenders (as
assuredly there will be), PbR and penalties for failure, the
risks and costs of reform, staff retention, and potential loss
of skills.77
After much activity between Breaking the Cycle of
December 2010 and the cumulative events of 2013, thirty
bidders passed the first stage of the competition process to
win the twenty-one CRC contracts and lead the new era in
a fight against offending.78 A me´lange of organizations and
partnerships who want to lead the Rehabilitation Revolu-
tion, such as private firms, charities, businesses, and mul-
tinationals, submitted bids. In addition to bids from lead
providers, 800 organizations expressed an interest in the
delivery supply chain, for contracts worth £450 million
annually. It was anticipated that the successful bidders
would be announced during the autumn of 2014. For the
Ministry of Justice, the Rehabilitation Revolution exempli-
fies innovative ways of doing business differently and the
best way of using tax-payers’ money. But these reforms
signalled the end of a probation service that had been
located in the public sector since 1907.
The House of Commons Justice Committee79 scruti-
nized the proposals for reform. Some committee members
expressed approbation at the direction of travel since 2008,
but others were concerned that reducing the role of the
public sector Probation Service is unconvincing, too risky,
untested and unpiloted, and unlikely to deliver better
results. Furthermore, there were divergent views from
witnesses appearing before the committee, with acknowl-
edgements that there are gaps in current practice, such as
support being unavailable to offenders leaving prison after
serving less than twelve months (erstwhile prison voluntary
after-care cases, PVAC). The evidence presented to the
committee during 2013, including that by Ministry of Jus-
tice officials, ultimately consolidated the position that
Transforming Rehabilitation has four elements:
• Extend statutory rehabilitation to those sentenced to
less than twelve months—an extra 50,000
offenders—which has recently been implemented to
ensure that all offenders released from prison receive
supervision.
• Open up rehabilitation services to a diverse market of
providers and new payment mechanisms.
• Create a new National Probation Service primarily
involved in public protection.
• Reorganize the prison estate.80
Most of the proposals can be undertaken through the
Offender Management Act 2007, but new legislation is
required to extend supervision to short-term prisoners in
the form of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014. The
conclusions and recommendations from the committee
report are enumerated as follows:
• Extending statutory supervision for offenders sen-
tenced to twelve months imprisonment or less is
a positive reform.
• There remain serious questions about the evidence
base for reform—ironic given the emphasis on
‘‘What Works’’ since 1992.
• Witnesses expressed apprehension at the pace, scale,
architecture, detail, and likely consequences of
reform.
• Risks to the system and costs.
• Retention of skills and the development of staff in
the twenty-one CRCs.
• Payment by Results: Is the principle of reward for
success and punishment for failure morally
acceptable?
• The Ministry has high expectations of what can be
achieved in the way of efficiency savings and
extension of services through contracting out the
management of low and medium risk offenders
within existing resources. It seems entirely feasi-
ble to us that as the competition progresses and
details are refined, the attractiveness of these
contracts might wane, resulting in incomplete or
inadequate provision in certain areas or types of
service.81
On Wednesday, October 29, 2014, Chris Grayling, Jus-
tice Secretary, announced the decision on the successful
bidders for the twenty-one Community Rehabilitation
Companies: Sodexo Justice Services in partnership with
National Association for the Care and Resettlement of
Offenders (NACRO) (6 areas); Achieving Real Change for
Communities (ARCC) (1 area); Purple Futures (5 areas);
The Reducing Reoffending Partnership (2 areas); Working
Links (3 areas); Geo Mercia Willowdene (1 area); MTCNovo
(2 areas); and Seetec (1 area).82
VI. Conclusion
Many changes have been imposed on the criminal justice
system in England and Wales since the 1980s, and specif-
ically after 1997, that have modernized and transformed
police, probation, and prisons. It is important to emphasize
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that the Rehabilitation Revolution during 2010–2015 was
driven forward on the platform of competition, privatiza-
tion, and marketization established by New Labour gov-
ernments after 1997.83 Saliently, the bulk of probation work
was privatized in 2014 with the creation of twenty-one
Community Rehabilitation Companies. Currently, the
National Probation Service is supervising high-risk and
seriously convicted offenders (approximately 50,000), and
privatized companies supervise low- to medium-risk
offenders (approximately 200,000), which includes com-
munity supervision and prisoners released on licence from
custodial facilities. Between 1993 and 2012, the prison
population increased by 41,800 to 86,000;84 in December
2015, the prison population was 85,847 (male 81,928,
female 3,919), and the latest projection is 90,000 by
2020.85 Furthermore, at 149 per 100,000 of the popula-
tion, England and Wales has the highest rate of imprison-
ment in Western Europe.86 Accordingly, modernization
and transformation affected all aspects of criminal and
social justice, probation, sentencing, and penal policy.
However, it is questionable whether all features of mod-
ernization and transformation have been in the interests of
justice.
Notes
1 See Philip Whitehead & Roger Statham, the History of Proba-
tion: Politics, Power and Cultural Change, 1876–2005 (2006).
2 Alistair Campbell, the Blair Years: Extracts from the Alistair
Campbell Diaries (2007).
3 Home Office, Correctional Policy Unit, Joining Forces to Protect
the Public, Prisons-Probation: A Consultation Document (HMSO,
1998), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/19990125100009/http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/cpu/
pcon1.htm [hereinafter Prisons-Probation].
4 See Philip Whitehead, Transforming Probation: Social Theory
and the Criminal Justice System (2016, forthcoming).
5 Lord David Windlesham, Responses to Crime, Volume 4: Dis-
pensing Justice 245 (2001).
6 Robert Reiner, Law and Order: An Honest Citizen’s Guide to
Crime and Control (2007).
7 Home Office, Criminal Justice: the Way Ahead, CM 5074
(HMSO 2001), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/criminal-justice-the-way-ahead.
8 Id. at 5.
9 Lord Justice Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England
and Wales (2001).
10 But see HomeOffice,Making Punishments Work: A Review of the
SentencingFrameworkForEnglandandWales(HallidayReview)
(2001), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/þ/http:/www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/halliday-
report-sppu/.
11 See Whitehead & Statham, supra note 1.
12 Patrick Carter, Managing Offenders, Reducing Crime: A New
Approach (Dec. 11, 2003).
13 Loraine Gelsthorpe & Rod Morgan, Handbook of Probation
(Willan, 2007); J.M. Hough, Robert Allen, & Una Padel,
Reshaping Probation and Prisons: the New Offender Man-
agement Framework (2006).
14 Ross Burnett, Kerry Baker, & Colin Roberts, Assessment,
Supervision and Intervention: Fundamental Practice in Proba-
tion at 228, in Handbook of Probation (Loraine Gelsthorpe &
Rod Morgan eds., Willan 2007).
15 Gelsthorpe & Morgan, supra note 13.
16 See infra Section V.
17 Home Office, Confident Communities in A Secure Britain: the
Home Office Strategic Plan 2004–08, CM 6287 (HMSO
2004), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251067/
6287.pdf.
18 Office for Criminal Justice Reform, Cutting Crime, Delivering
Justice: A Strategic Plan for Criminal Justice 2004–08, CM 6288
(HMSO 2004), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251064/
6288.pdf.
19 Whitehead & Statham, supra note 1.
20 Richard G. Wilkinson & Kate Pickett, the Spirit Level: Why
More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better (2009).
21 Charles Clarke, Home Secretary, Where Next for Penal Policy?,
Speech at Prison Reform Trust (Sept. 19, 2005).
22 National Offender Management Service, The NOMS Offender
Management Model, para. 13.3–13.4 (May 2006), available
at https://www.swmcrc.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/
05/offender_management_model_1.pdf.
23 Home Office, A Five Year Strategy for Protecting the Public and
Reducing Re-offending, CM 6717 (HMSO 2006), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/272221/6717.pdf.
24 Id. at para. 1.4.
25 But see George Mair, Lol Burke, & Stuart Taylor, ‘‘The Worst
Tax Form You’ve Ever Seen’’? Probation Officers’ views about
OASYS, 53 Probation J. 7–23 (2006), DOI: 10.1177/
0264550506060861.
26 Home Office, supra note 23.
27 Id. at para. 3.12.
28 Id. at para. 4.3.
29 Home Office, Rebalancing the Criminal Justice System in Favour
of the Law-Abiding Majority: Cutting Crime, Reducing Re-
offending and Protecting the Public (July 2006), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060904
182404/http:/homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/CJS-review.
pdf/CJS-review-english.pdf?view¼Binary.
30 Home Office, Delivering Simple, Speedy, Summary Justice (July
2006), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/þ/http:/www.dca.gov.uk/publications/reports_reviews/
delivery-simple-speedy.pdf.
31 For a detailed discussion, see Whitehead, supra note 4.
32 Carter, Managing Offenders, supra note 12.
33 Home Office, Improving Prison and Probation Services: Public
Value Partnerships (NOMS, August 2006).
34 Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, Policy Review: Crime, Justice
and Cohesion (Cabinet Office, 2006).
35 Credit crunch could lead to crime wave, Home Office warns
Downing Street, The Telegraph, Aug. 31, 2008, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/
2657335/Credit-crunch-could-lead-to-crime-wave-Home-
Office-warns-Downing-Street.html.
36 Enver Soloman, Chris Eades, Richard Garside, & Max Ruther-
ford, Ten Years of Criminal Justice under Labour: An Independent
Audit (Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2007), available at
http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/sites/crimeandjustice.
org.uk/files/ten-years-of-labour-2007.pdf.
37 Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, supra note 34.
38 Lord Patrick Carter, Securing the Future: Proposals for the Effi-
cient and Sustainable Use of Custody in England and Wales (Lord
Carter’s Review of Prisons) (Ministry of Justice, 2007), available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_12_07_
prisons.pdf.
39 Auld, supra note 9, at 19.
40 Carter, Securing the Future, supra note 38, at 51.
41 See Philip Whitehead, Reconceptualising the Moral Economy
of Criminal Justice: A New Perspective (2015).
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL . 28 , NO . 4 • APR IL 2016 301
42 Conservative Party, Prisons with a Purpose: Our Sentencing and
Rehabilitation Revolution to Break the Cycle of Crime, Security
Agenda Policy Green Paper Number 4 (2008).
43 Id. at 4.
44 Id. at 25.
45 Id. at 80.
46 Philip Whitehead, Payment by Results: The Materialist Recon-
struction of criminal Justice, 35(5/6) Int’l J. Soc. & Soc. Pol’y
290 (2015).
47 Home Office, A Review of Criminal Justice Policy 1976 (HMSO,
1977).
48 Rob Canton, Probation and the Tragedy of Punishment, 46(3)
Howard J. 236, 236 (2007).
49 Ministry of Justice, Breaking the Cycle: Effective Punishment,
Rehabilitation, and Sentencing of Offenders, Green Paper CM
7972 (Stationary Office 2010), available at http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120119200607/http:/www.
justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/breaking-the-cycle.pdf.
50 Id. at 5.
51 Whitehead, supra note 46.
52 Cabinet Office, Modernising Commissioning: Increasing the
Role of Charities, Social Enterprises, Mutuals and Cooperatives
in Public Service Delivery (2010), available at https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/78924/commissioning-green-paper.pdf.
53 Id. at 9.
54 Whitehead, supra note 41.
55 HM Government, Open Public Services, at 5, White Paper CM
8145 (Ministry for Government Policy, 2011), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-public-
services-white-paper.
56 Id. at para. 5.14.
57 Id. at para. 1.27.
58 Ministry of Justice, Competition Strategy for Offender Services
(July 2011), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217248/
competition-strategy-offender-services.pdf.
59 Currently there are 14 private and 130 public prisons, includ-
ing 16 Young Offender Institutions, in England and Wales.
60 Ministry of Justice, supra note 58, at 15.
61 Home Office, supra note 47.
62 Ministry of Justice, Punishment and Reform: Effective Commu-
nity Sentences, Consultation Paper CP8/2012, CM 8334
(Stationary Office, Mar. 2012), available at https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/228573/8334.pdf.
63 Ministry of Justice, Punishment and Reform: Effective Probation
Services, Consultation Paper CP7/2012, CM 8333 (Stationary
Office, Mar. 2012), available at https://consult.justice.gov.
uk/digital-communications/effective-probation-services/
supporting_documents/probationreviewconsultation.pdf.
64 Ministry of Justice, Punishment and Reform: Effective Commu-
nity Sentences, at 3, Consultation Paper CP8/2012, CM 8334
(Stationary Office, Mar. 2012), available at https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/228573/8334.pdf.
65 Whitehead, supra note 4.
66 Ministry of Justice, Swift and Sure Justice: The Government’s
Plans for Reform of the Criminal Justice System, White Paper
CM 8388 (Stationary Office, July 2012), available at https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/217328/swift-and-sure-justice.pdf.
67 Ministry of Justice, Transforming Rehabilitation: A Summary of
Evidence on Reducing Reoffending, Analytical Series (2013),
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243718/evidence-
reduce-reoffending.pdf.
68 Ministry of Justice, Transforming Rehabilitation: A Revolution in
the Way We Manage Offenders, Part C, Consultation Paper
CP1/2013, CM 8517 (Stationary Office, Jan. 2013), available
at https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/
transforming-rehabilitation/supporting_documents/
transformingrehabilitation.pdf
69 Ministry of Justice, Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for
Reform, Response to Consultation Paper CP(R)16/2013, CM
8619 (Stationary Office, May 2013), available at https://
consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/
transforming-rehabilitation/results/transforming-
rehabilitation-response.pdf.
70 Id. at 14.
71 Id. at 15.
72 Id. at 20–23.
73 Id. at 24–32.
74 Ministry of Justice, Target Operating Manual: Rehabilitation
Programme (Sept. 2013), available at https://www.justice.
gov.uk/downloads/rehab-prog/competition/target-
operating-model.pdf.
75 Id. at 5.
76 Personal communication between probation officers and
author, 2013–2014, notes on file with author.
77 Id.
78 Ministry of Justice, Best in the Business: Bidding to Rehabilitate
Offenders, Press Release, 19 Dec. 2013, available at https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/best-in-the-business-
bidding-to-rehabilitate-offenders.
79 House of Commons Justice Committee, Crime Reduction Pol-
icies: A Co-ordinated Approach? Interim Report on the Govern-
ment’s Transforming Rehabilitation Programme, Twelfth Report
of Session 2013–14 (Stationary Office, 14 Jan. 2014), avail-
able at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2013
14/cmselect/cmjust/1004/1004.pdf.
80 Id. at 5–6.
81 House of Commons Justice Committee, supra note 79, at pp.
59–60, para. 25.
82 Widely covered in news services at the time; see, e.g., Alan
Travis, Two companies to run more than half of probation ser-
vices, The Guardian, October 29, 2014, available at http://
www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/29/justice-
probation-contracts-private-companies.
83 For a critical discussion of these developments, see White-
head, supra notes 4 and 41.
84 Ministry of Justice, Story of the Prison Population: 1993–2012
England and Wales (Jan. 2013), available at https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/218185/story-prison-population.pdf.
85 Ministry of Justice, Prison Population Projections: 2014–2020
England and Wales, Statistics Bulletin (Nov. 2014), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/380586/prison-population-
projections-2014-2020.pdf.
86 Michael Teague, Neoliberalism, Prisons and Probation in the
United States and England and Wales, in Organising Neoliber-
alism: Markets, Privatisation and Justice (Philip Whitehead &
Paul Crawshaw eds., 2012).
302 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL . 28 , NO . 4 • APR I L 2016
